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LAW OF~ PooR. By Arthur B. La France, Milton R. Schroeder, 
Robert W. Bennett, and William E. Boyd. St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company. 1973. Pp. xx.vi, 558. $13. 
According to its four authors, Law of the Poor, a new addition to 
the West Publishing Company's Hornbook Series "should be of use 
in the study, teaching and practice of law" (p. xix). This review will 
focus on the book's potential effect on its two anticipated markets-
law schools and OEO or community-oriented law offices. Unfortu-
nately, the book will be of little use to practicing poverty attorneys 
and may actually have a harmful effect if used in the law schools. 
The title of the book is a misnomer. The book does not attempt 
to deal comprehensively with the legal problems of poor people; 
those problems involve virtually the entire breadth of the law. In-
stead, the authors have dealt with four substantive areas of law. The 
four chapters are "Low Income Consumers and the Law," "Housing 
and Poverty," "The Welfare System," and "Federal Judicial Reme-
dies for the Poor." Certain areas, such as bankruptcy and domestic 
relations, that are of particular interest to the poor are excluded 
from the text because the authors believe adequate texts already 
exist (p. xvii).1 Despite its interesting analysis of some specific legal 
problems, the book's treatment of the legal problems of the poor in 
isolation from the rest of our legal system could have adverse con-
sequences for legal education. 
Ten years ago, law school curricula could generally have been 
characterized as three-year courses in the "law of the rich." Educa-
tors described these curricula as being organized around the profit 
system2 or concerned with the "wealth process."3 Most courses were 
specifically directed toward training law students to represent the 
wealthy. And, even within potentially neutral courses, problems of 
poor people were scrupulously avoided. For example, a course in 
bankruptcy would focus on business failures and railroad reorganiza-
tions, rather than on wage-earner bankruptcies. A course in adminis-
trative law would deal with the problems of practice before the FTC 
or the FAA, rather than with those of the welfare system. In real 
I. The same rationale might have justified omitting other sections of the book. See 
note 28 infra and accompanying text. 
2. See Ares, Legal Education and the Problem of the Poor, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 307, 307 
(1965). 
3. Taylor, Wealth, Poverty and Social Change: A Suggestion for a Balanced Cttr-
riculum, 22 J. LEGAL En. 227, 229 (1969). 
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property little time would be spent on the most common and vital 
real estate transaction for many members of our society-the renting 
of a residential apartment. And needless to say, the course in corpora-
tions would not consider the use of the corporate structure for non-
profit goals. 
In the mid-1960's came pressures, primarily from law students, 
for some attention in the law school curricula to problems more 
typically faced by the poor and the middle class. Since law schools 
were oriented toward discussion of the affairs of the well-to-do, the 
immediate response to this pressure was frequently to introduce new 
courses, one called "Law of the Poor" and perhaps another dealing 
with the welfare system or consumer law. Law of the Poor is one of 
a series of books written for use in such courses.4 The introduction 
of these courses in the late 1960's signified some social progress by 
recognizing the obvious-poor people are affected by our legal struc-
ture. However, by continuing to segregate the study of these prob-
lems from other substantive courses, law schools have missed a sig-
nificant opportunity. Examination of the impact of law on the poor 
in conjunction with the study of the same legal doctrines in other 
settings would increase the student's understanding of the societal 
impact of law, as well as bring a fuller understanding of the particu-
lar impact of law on poor people. 
Consider, for example, the development of the commercial law 
doctrines regarding holders iii due course of negotiable instruments. 
When English courts developed these rules in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries one goal of their decisions was to encourage the 
expansion of the use of these instruments.5 Even today, the Uniform 
Commercial Code states an underlying purpose of permitting "the 
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage 
and agreement of the parties."6 Consequently, courses studying ne-
gotiable instruments focused exclusively upon difficulties that arose 
when one merchant signed a negotiable instrument payable to an-
other. In that context, rules of law could be analyzed to determine 
whether they were beneficial to the business community that used 
these instruments. Such courses would study, for example, the intri-
cacies of the use of a sight draft in a documentary transaction, a 
complicated financial arrangement used to minimize the opportunity 
for fraud in sales transactions across geographical distances. 
By the mid-twentieth century, however, numerous nonmerchant 
consumers were also signing negotiable instruments as part of retail 
4. See, e.g., G. COOPER, C. BERGER, P. DODYK, M. PAULSEN, P. SCHRAG&: M. SovERN, 
CAsES AND MATERIALS ON LAw AND POVERTY (2d ed. 1973). 
5. See, e.g., Gill v. Cubitt, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824); Peacock v. Rhodes, 99 Eng. 
Rep. 398 (K.B. 1781). 
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE§ l-102(2)(b). 
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credit sales. In this new context, rules concerning the status of the 
holder in due course that had been developed for use in merchant 
transactions proved to have such disastrous social consequences that 
these doctrines had to be limited both by court decision7 and by 
statute.8 
Where should this recent legal development best be studied? It 
would be easy, within the framework of law school politics, to assign 
such developments to a course on "law of the poor." The commercial 
law teacher would then be free to continue to devote most class time 
to truly "commercial" problems. Those students who were interested 
in consumer law could be told: "You can learn of these develop-
ments either in our course on poverty law or in our course on con-
sumer law." Many students interested in doing consumer work 
would be happy with this trade-off; the student could take the course 
in consumer law and study the material of his particular concern, 
without first having to master the commercial settings that gave rise 
to the development of negotiable instruments. The realization that, 
without a working knowledge of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
the purely commercial uses of negotiable instruments, a lawyer 
would be handicapped in handling "consumer" problems might only 
come years later. 
Similarly, we can ask in what part of the school curriculum 
should one study the doctrines of warranty of habitability and con-
structive eviction concerning residential rentals. Law of the Poor 
tells us: "The traditional law of landlord-tenant relations has given 
little comfort to tenants who are poor" (p. 231). This statement is 
undoubtedly true. However, the traditional law of landlord-tenant 
relations has given little comfort to any tenant. In fact, Anglo-
American real property law developed in order to protect the prop-
erty rights of a landed aristocracy against all tenants. But, once again, 
should the problems of the poor tenant be studied separately or 
should those problems be integrated into every first-year student's 
study of real property? 
The segregation of the study of both these topics could only be 
justified on the assumption that these problems are not really part 
of the general fabric of the law, but rather are special problems that 
affect only the small class of poor people. However, that assumption 
is faulty. These problems can no longer be viewed as problems 
solely of poor people. Many of America's traditional middle class 
reside in rental property and buy personal goods in credit transac-
tions. Obviously, the less a consumer can afford to pay, the more 
7. See, e.g., Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 S.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Unko v. Owen, 
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). 
8. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CooE § 1804.2 (West 1973) ("Unruh Act'); WIS. STAT. 
§§ 422.407(1), .408(1) (1971). 
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likely it is that problems will arise concerning· the quality of the 
goods or payment for them. However, these problems today affect an 
ever larger sector of our population, and, as described below, certain 
legal techniques for dealing with them may actually be more .feasible 
if the consumer is middle-class rather than poor. 
More importantly, these doctrines were not developed by one 
small class of unscrupulous merchants and landlords to be used 
against the minority poverty segment of our population. They were 
the natural outgrowth of a legal system that was premised on the 
protection of vested property interests. By studying these problems 
in context, the student with a special interest in law reform is given 
deeper understanding and thus more skills for combatting the harm-
ful effects of this thrust of our law. In addition, the student who 
enters the course with no such interest may also begin to be more 
sensitive to the basic forces that shape the growth and development 
of legal doctrines through the addition of another dimension of 
policy considerations. 
Legal education has changed over the past ten years. No longer 
will any course on commercial law be totally devoid of consideration 
of the problems of low income consumers.9 Similarly, first-year real 
property courses now devote more attention to residential landlord-
tenant problems.10 Today, the appearance of Law of the Poor will 
not promote this development. Rather, by the very quality of its 
analysis of specific issues, it may even discourage the complete inte-
gration of these problems into other courses in the law school where 
they could more productively be studied. 
The text might have served a more constructive academic func-
tion if it had developed some over-all appreciation of the treatment 
that poor people receive in our sbciety. It almost studiously avoids 
such an approach. For example, the section on the welfare system 
makes no comparisons with tax-free bonds, inherited wealth, or other 
instances of "welfare for the rich." There is virtually no attempt to 
investigate the possibility that various work requirements for the 
receipt of welfare are an attempt to provide industry with cheap 
labor for undesirable jobs. Similarly, although there is ample discus-
sion of the mechanics of various government housing programs, 
there is no attempt to examine whether the main beneficiaries of 
such programs are actually potential renters or the developers and 
builders of these homes. The extent to which the "housing problem" 
9. See, e.g., V. COUNTRYMAN &: A. KAUFMAN, CoMMERClAL LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 
324•34, 383-95 (1971); R. NORDSTROM &: A. CLOVIS, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON COMMER-
CIAL PAPER 334-70, 403-13 (1972); R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MA-
TERIALS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 218-302 (1969). 
IO. See, e.g., o. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JOLIN, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 372-77, 
391-402, 442-79 (2d ed. 1973); A. CAsNER & W. LEACH, CAsES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 
499-559 (2d ed. 1969). 
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of the poor is but a manifestation of economic distribution patterns 
is not explored. 
Thus, Law of the Poor does not seem beneficial for the education 
of law students. Unfortunately, neither will it be of much use to 
the practicing attorney. The book discusses many academic issues 
without drawing attention to their practical importance. This is 
particularly surprising in view of author LaFrance's experience and 
skill as both a litigator11 and educator of OEO lawyers. In the area 
of federal procedure, for example, Law of the Poor devotes over ten 
pages to various issues regarding three-judge federal courts (pp. 499-
511 ), but the practicing attorney is given little advice as to when it 
is more desirable to present a case before a single judge than before 
a three-judge panel. Since it is often possible for an attorney to frame 
a complaint to avoid the convening of a three-judge court, a discus-
sion of the factors to consider in making that tactical decision should 
precede any analysis of the procedure itself. Similarly, although the 
book spends many pages discussing difficulties and complications 
in class actions (pp. 427-43), there is no discussion of when it is 
tactically disadvantageous to bring such a suit. Frequently, if the re-
lief sought is an injunction against a state official or even a private 
party, an order against a defendant may have the same effect whether 
suit is brought by an individual or by a class. Thus, it may be desir-
able to refrain from bringing a class action in order to avoid such 
time-consuming problems as having to give notice to the class. Such 
tactical considerations should precede any technical discussion of 
class actions and would have been useful for the practicing poverty 
attorney. 
Furthermore, in its technical discussion of substantive legal rules 
the book fails to impart the collective wisdom of almost ten years 
of experience by legal service lawyers in that it does not attempt to 
alert new OEO lawyers to the need to allocate their time carefully 
and to use efficient methods to represent the interests of the poor. 
Since it is inconceivable that there will be an adequate number of 
such attorneys in the foreseeable future, such training is crucial. 
For example, the book discusses a change of law enacted by the 
UCC. Previously, under the Uniform Sales Act, a buyer had to show 
actual reliance on a representation in order to sue for breach of an 
express warranty.12 Under section 2-313 of the UCC, the buyer need 
only prove that the representation was "part of the basis of the bar-
gain." The book concludes that this change is significant: "Because 
the question of what has become part of the basis of the bargain 
11. Professor LaFrance was counsel for the appellants in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371 (1971) (requirement of payment of fees as condition to instituting divorce pro• 
ceedings held a denial of·due process when applied to indigent litigants). 
12. UNIFOR!II SALES Acr § 12. 
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must ultimately be a question of fact, often for a jury to resolve, 
such a shift in the burden of proof could greatly enhance the buyer's 
position" (p. 34). However, a poor consumer most frequently be-
comes involved in breaches of express warranties in the purchase of 
items such as a 400-dollar used car. It is not economically feasible to 
bring suit on behalf of such a client to vindicate his legal rights. 
Such a suit requires painstaking factual preparation, both as to the 
negotiation of the sale and the mechanical problems, and cannot be 
economically pursued by an attorney who is practicing for a fee. 
Similarly, it makes little economic sense for an OEO office to bring 
such an action if the cost to the organization in attorney's time and 
other expenses is greater than the amount of money in dispute. Ironi-
cally, if the item purchased were more expensive, and therefore more 
likely to have been bought by a middle-class or wealthy consumer, 
this rule of law might be more useful in litigation. 
Despite the practical difficulties, such a suit may be of use to poor 
consumers if it is brought as part of a selective campaign against one · 
particularly offending used-car dealer. Even though bringing the suit 
might not make economic sense in the individual case, it might make 
even less economic sense for the target used-car dealer to continue his 
offensive practices if t6 do so appears certain to necessitate large at-
torney's bills. The text gives the young attorney no hint that by 
carefully litigating a number of cases against a particular defendant, 
one can force that defendant to change his practices and produce far 
greater benefits to poor consumers than would result from winning 
several law suits against a number of used-car dealers. 
The text discusses the "right to hearing" cases that culminated 
in Fuentes v. Shevin,18 in which the United States Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional a prejudgment replevin statute. The text, how-
ever, gives little indication of the true practical significance of that 
decision. Perhaps the reason is its failure to identify adequately the 
cause of most disputes over payment for goods in the retail install-
ment setting. The text states that nonpayment, the most common 
form of a buyer's breach of a retail installment contract, frequently 
happens because of "a dispute benveen the creditor and debtor re-
garding the creditor's performance, for example, as to the quality of 
goods sold" (p. 74). This is undoubtedly true. However, experience 
shows that the most common reason for default on payment is that 
the consumer does not have enough money to make the payments. 
The importance of Fuentes is not that it will allow such a buyer to 
present valid defenses. Rather, if the seller realizes that he will have 
to go through a costly legal procedure in order to repossess, he may 
be more receptive to negotiating an accommodation with the buyer, 
13. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
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perhaps reducing the amount of money due, and certainly accepting 
extended payments. 
Similarly, the text's treatment of summary eviction proceedings 
against tenants shows little understanding of the problems with 
these procedures in practice. The section on summary eviction pro-
ceedings deals solely with the issue of whether summary eviction 
procedures are constitutionally valid (pp. 242-44). Yet, any legal 
service attorney knows that if a landlord is determined to evict, it 
is impossible to keep a month-to-month tenant in a home indefi-
nitely. The chief social evil of summary eviction proceedings is not 
a hypothetical violation of equal protection or due process, argu-
ments that were rejected by the present United States Supreme 
Court in Lindsey v. Normet,14 but the fact that these procedures are 
designed to enable one individual or corporation to force another 
individual to leave his home on a few days' notice. Summary eviction 
proceedings are statutory, and an attorney, by insisting that the land-
lord comply with the letter of the law in order to avail himself of 
this extraordinary remedy, can mitigate the harshest consequences 
of the law by delaying the eviction for a substantial time, certainly 
long enough to allow the tenant time to find a new home. A landlord 
unused to tenants consulting attorneys may well have given the 
tenant legally insufficient notice to vacate the premises. Quite fre-
quently, any action for summary ~viction is subject to a demurrer or 
motion to dismiss. In addition, landlords almost invariably ask for 
rents due and, perhaps, damages.15 An attorney for a tenant, by argu-
ing the demurrer or motion to dismiss, if any, and then answering 
and setting for trial on the issue of damages may frequently generate 
several months for his client to find a new place to live. Moreover, 
once lawyers of landlords are made aware that an eviction proceeding 
will be opposed, they will be likely to urge the landlord to give the 
tenant reasonable opportunity to find a new home, and the legal 
service Ia-wyer can settle the matter with a phone call or two. Even 
if the defense of an eviction proceeding necessitates a court appear-
ance, this work can be highly routinized. And if the tenant finds a 
new place to live before trial the landlord's attorney is frequently 
quite willing to drop the action for damages in return for an im-
mediate quitting of the premises, especially if the landlord's attorney 
realizes that the tenant is poor and that any judgment for damages is 
likely to be uncollectable. . 
The text hints at a similar approach for le~l service attorneys 
in a different context. It states that, in the consumer setting, the dis-
14. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
15. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1174 (West 1972) (treble damages recoverable if 
the tenant's holdover is malicious). 
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covery by the attorney for the buyer of a Truth-in-Lending Act16 
violation by the seller will provide "a negotiating tool even as to 
disputes unrelated to credit term. disclosure" (p. 22). This is obviously 
the most important use of the Act by consumer la·wyers. It is unfor-
tunate that Law of the Poor does not draw attention to the analogous 
uses of substantive and procedural rules in the practical art of achiev-
ing solutions to the legal problems of the poor. 
The lawyer making such use of the Truth-in-Lending legislation 
or defending a summary eviction proceeding is, in essence, providing 
service for the client in the time-honored fashion perfected by per-
sonal injury defense lawyers in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. The lawyer performs nit-picking technical defense 
work in order to place the client in the best bargaining position. 
Such tactics will make the legal service lawyer no more popular with 
landlords and merchants, or their lawyers, than insurance lawyers 
are with victims of accidents, but effective representation of the poor 
client can be achieved. Unfortunately, Law of the Poor gives no 
indication of the breadth of services that can actually be provided. 
Instead, the authors reveal their ideal of the legal service attorney 
most clearly when they state: "[W]here a poverty client's claim has 
far-reaching, novel implications which may ultimately warrant re-
view by the United States Supreme Court, it is best to start with a 
federal forum from which expeditious, and often direct, review is 
available in that Court" (p. 382). Indeed, a quick perusal of the wel-
fare cases decided by the United States Supreme Court during the 
late 1960's shows the monumental changes tha.t can occasionally be 
brought about by well conceived and executed law reform cases. For 
example, Shapiro v. Thompson,11 by forbidding year-long residency 
requirements for welfare eligibility, prevented the practice of punish-
ing poor people who had moved by denying them benefits. Similarly, 
King v. Smith,18 which outlawed the denial of aid to dependent chil-
dren because their mother was living with a man to whom she was 
not married, did much to eliminate one of the most demeaning wel-
fare abuses-the midnight raid to ascertain the sex habits of welfare 
recipients.19 The time spent by the attorneys who brought these cases 
undoubtedly did more for welfare recipients than could have been 
a~complished by any other allocation of attorney time. 
Notwithstanding the impact of these suits, Supreme Court deci-
sions in the poverty area were numerically insignificant even under 
the Warren Court. And any attorney experienced enough to be han-
dling one of these rare cases hardly needed to be reminded of the 
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-8lt (1970). 
1'7. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
18. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
19. But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), upholding a New York statute au-
thorizing denial of welfare benefits to applicants refusing certain home visits. 
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importance of planning a procedural strategy. Moreover, times 
change. With four Nixon appointees on the Court, lawyers for the 
poor, even when working in the area of welfare reform, will have 
to concentrate on techniques other than the constitutional challenge 
brought through the federal courts to the Supreme Court. The 
Court's 1970 opinion in Dandridge v. Williams,20 upholding a Mary-
land statute setting the maximum welfare grant available to any 
family, served notice that it would look with disfavor on arguments 
claiming state welfare statutes violative of equal protection in that 
they constitute underinclusive solutions to social problems.21 Simi-
larly, last term the Court, in New York State Department of Social 
Services v. Dublino,22 upheld a law requiring certain welfare re-
cipients either to take part in a work incentive program or to become 
ineligible for a welfare grant. Although the Burger Court has 
reached some decisions favorable to welfare litigants on statutory 
grounds,23 it seems unlikely that the Court will, in the near future, 
make active us~ of the Constitution as a tool to limit hardships cre-
ated by poverty. On the contrary, in Edelman v. ]ordan,24 the Su-
preme Court during this present term inventively resurrected the 
eleventh amendment in order to bar a federal district court from or-
dering retroactive payments of benefits found to have been wrong-
fully withheld. Consequently, and contrary to the suggestion of the 
text, poverty lawyers in jurisdictions such as California often attempt 
to avoid federal courts, feeling that there would be more chance for 
success in the state court system.25 One might even argue that to 
bring welfare law reform suits in federal courts will establish prece-
dents, contrary to the interests of the poor, that will impede future 
courts more receptive to such reform. Perhaps advocates of the poor 
should now be urged to avoid bringing law reform suits unless the 
chances for success seem great. 
20. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
21. See 397 U.S. at 484-85. 
22. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
23. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) (holding that absence of a parent 
due to military service satisfies the continued absence of a parent criterion of the 
Social Security Act); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (invalidating Illinois 
regulations denying AFDC payments for dependent children between ages 18 and 20 
who are attending college). 
24. 42 U.S.L.W. 4419 (U.S., March 26, 1974). 
25. The text hints that state courts may not always be less sympathetic to the poor 
than are the federal courts (p. 382). However, it fails to develop this point even though 
some of its own case analysis provides a clear example (pp. 312-15). Compare Jefferson 
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding Texas standard of need reduction scheme 
disadvantageous to AFDC recipients) with Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal. 3d 227, 490 P.2d 1148, 98 
Cal. Rptr. 640 (1971) (7-0 decision), vacated mem., 406 U.S. 965 (1972). On remand the 
California Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision and followed Jefferson, Villa v. 
Hall, 7 Cal. 3d 926, 500 P.2d 887, 103 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1972). 
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Law of the Poor does not deal with a number of important ways 
in which the poverty lawyer can aid his clients. For example, a cam-
paign of selective suits to reform a particular automobile dealer 
might be even more effective if carried out in conjunction with the 
work of a consumer group. It may generate adverse though truthful 
publicity that can have beneficial results. The text, however, gives 
little help to an attorney working for a consumer group. It is silent 
on the problems of consumer picketing and on methods to involve 
state regulatory agencies in investigations of merchants. Similarly, 
although the text's section on housing and poverty devotes consider-
able attention to methods of developing public housing, there is 
no mention of the difficult legal problems an attorney can face when 
advising renters on such questions as the means and 'legality of rent 
strikes. The entire section on welfare rights makes little mention of 
the existence of state regulations; the failure of local welfare_ officials 
to follow even these regulations causes arbitrary decisions that 
alienate and discourage many welfare recipients. An attorney, par-· 
ticularly one working through a local welfare rights organization, 
should first assure that such regulations are being followed, and thus 
perhaps eliminate the need to file a major law reform case. 
The text does not encourage Ia-wyers to act as counsel for groups 
attempting to change social conditions directly, such as by lowering 
local prices. With the exception of the discussion of methods of ere- .. 
ating public housing programs (pp. 106-62),26 there is no hint that\ 
attorneys for the poor can help by counseling reform groups in the 
formation of such institutions as producing or consuming coopera-
tives, thus directly attacking poverty by generating more income or 
lowering expenses. 
Attorneys for the rich discovered many years ago that the legal 
problems of an economic class can frequently be best resolved 
through legislation. And during those periods when legislatures have 
· been more progressive than the Supreme Court, lawyers represent-
ing progressive interests have similarly turned to lobbying. For ex-
ample, during the 1930's, labor attorneys found Congress more re-
sponsive to their needs than the courts. Today, lawyers for the poor 
should also focus on legislative solutions to legal problems. There 
is no comprehensive attempt in the text to discuss techniques and 
priorities for effective lobbying work. While OEO attorneys may face 
limitations on lobbying, there are no1v many private consumer law-
yers who would appreciate advice as to the best methods of undertak-
ing such activities. Yet, in dealing with consumer credit, for example, 
the text states that "the concern for reform in the area of finance 
26. The authoIS are careful to caution the reader that "this text is not a sponsor's 
development manual" (p. 105) and to provide citations to such practice aids (p. 105 n.7). 
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charges reemerged with the UCCC" (p. 63). It fails to emphasize the 
extent to which this statute is actually an enormous step backward 
for any state that has already adopted consumer legislation.27 For 
example, in California last year it was quite evident that consumer 
groups were fighting the UCCC while large national retailing organi-
zations were its chief supporters.28 
The publication of Law of the Poor makes a limited contribu-
tion. Much of its case analysis, although technically correct, is dupli• 
cative29 and more properly considered within other substantive fields 
of study. The book misses the opportunity to investigate the eco-
nomic and--social underpinnings of the legal rules that control the 
poor. Law of the Poor's lack of practical focus is a difficulty en-
countered in most law school texts, but it is most distressing to find 
this failing in a book that purports to be of use to the practicing 
attorney and that covers fields in which lawyers have conceived so 
many practical solutions to challenging legal problems. The book's 
implicit assumption that poor people's problems exist apart from the 
rest of the legal system may help to perpetuate a philosophy that has 
allowed many of the brightest law students to conclude that there is 
no inconsistency in working for a large downtown law firm while 
volunteering one night a week to help solve the problems of the 
poor-problems· that the legal system to which they contribute in 
their regular work has helped to create. The book may meet the 
needs of such dil~ttantes, but it lacks the integrated analysis, perspec-
tive, and practical focus that would aid an attorney intending to 
represent poor clients on a full-time basis. 
Neil M. Levy* 
Associate Professor of Law 
Golden Gate University 
27. See Willier, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: What Should Legal Service 
Attorneys Do?, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE R.Ev. 33 (1969). 
28. See also Davis, Leglislative Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case 
Study of the Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MicH. L. 
R.Ev. 1, 9-10 (1973) (discussing opposition of Wisconsin consumer representatives to 
adoption of the UCCC). 
29. See J .. WHITE&: R, SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM• 
MERCIAL CODE (1972); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (2d cd, 
1970). 
• Mr. Levy has practiced with California Rural Legal Assistance and California 
Indian Legal Services. 
